Abstract: Open source collaborations are increasingly among commercial rms whose interest is pro t. Why would pro t-motivated rms voluntarily share code? One reason is that cost reductions can outweigh increases in rivalry. This is especially persuasive when the contributors make complementary products. However, cost reductions do not explain why open source is a more pro 2 This is emphasized by Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) . Patent practice has evolved so that very little about the nature of a program must be disclosed in a patent; see Lemley et al. 2002 at 204-205. For copyrighted source code, there is an explicit exemption. See U.S. Copyright Circular 61. The anomaly is interesting in its own right. It reveals that the theory behind disclosure is a little shaky.
The open-source framework contrasts sharply with the secrecy and exclusivity that usually accompany intellectual property protection. Early commentators explained this new development model as signaling. A programmer who gets her code accepted into the project is evidently competent, and will get a good job. There are other indirect advantages as well (see the survey by Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) open source can be pro table, but that it is more pro table than the alternatives. Polansky delivers bad news in this regard. He focuses on the fact that proprietary licensing leads to a hold-up problem, which can end the sequence of innovations prematurely. He shows that, to some extent, this problem can be overcome with the GPL. However, the rst innovator will not choose the GPL except in special circumstances. The rst innovator would generally nd the proprietary model more pro table than the GPL. If the rst innovator chooses proprietary licensing, it will propagate forward to every subsequent innovator. The string of sequential innovations may be shorter with proprietary licenses than with GPL, but the additional pro t that the rst innovator earns from proprietary licensing will outweigh that defect.
Like Polansky, I consider sequential innovations, although only two. Instead of assuming that the order of innovators is given, I imagine that after the rms join the collaboration, it is unknown which rm will develop the rst contribution. Like Polansky, I show that the rst innovator would choose proprietary licensing rather than the GPL.
However, proprietary licensing is not the best thing for the industry as a whole. Industry pro t is higher with the GPL than if the rst innovator sets in motion a sequence of proprietary licenses. This has an important implication, which is the main idea of this paper. If the industry as a whole can commit to the GPL from behind a \veil of ignorance" { before it is known which rm will be the rst innovator { then all of them pro t. This is a deal they would gladly make ex ante, even though each one would prefer proprietary licensing once he nds himself in the position of rst innovator. 4 
A Simple Model of Symmetric Complements
I consider two products that do not compete in the market, but use technologies that can be complements. Each product has a stand-alone commercial value v if it uses only its own core technology. It has commercial value 2v if it also uses a complementary technology brought into existence with the other product. There is a compatibility issue: the second technology cannot be made compatible unless the rst technology is \open."
As in Ted O'Donoghue, Suzanne Scotchmer and Jacques Thisse (1997), Suzanne Scotchmer (1999), and Nisvan Erkal and Suzanne Scotchmer (2009), I assume that ideas for innovation are scarce { not everyone has the same investment opportunities. An innovation requires both an idea and an incentive to invest in it. To keep it simple, I assume that a single random rm will receive an idea for each technology. To implement the idea, the idea recipient must invest an R&D cost that is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on an interval that I will take to be [0; 3v]. Let c 1 be the random cost of the idea for the rst technology , and let c 2 be the random cost of the idea for the second technology. 5 There are a large number of potential idea recipients, and there is negligible probability that any rm receives ideas for both technologies. It is not known in advance which rms will receive ideas.
If the costs c 1 and c 2 are both revealed before making the investments, the pro t max-imizing strategy is to invest in both ideas if
The problem is that, if c 1 is high, these investments might not take place, even when (1) will eventually be satis ed.
Because the rms are identical at the outset, they will use the same strategy, namely, a pair of threshold values ( c 1 ; c 2 ) such that the rm invests in the rst technology (similarly, the second) if it has an idea for the rst (similarly, the second) with cost less than c 1
Since a rm does not know in advance whether it will receive the rst idea, the second idea, or any idea at all, rms should jointly favor investment strategies that maximize industry pro t. I will use this as a benchmark. The best joint venture would be an agreement to wait for both ideas before investing, and to implement (1) in some cost-sharing agreement.
I assume that is impossible due to the di culties of coordinating a large number of potential innovators, and because it is unknown when and if the second idea will arrive. (The timing is not essential to my arguments and not modeled here.)
Instead, the benchmark I use for \e ciency" is a strategy that maximizes industry pro ts under the restriction that the planner cannot wait for both ideas before deciding whether to invest in the rst idea. Investing in the rst idea creates value v in its own right, but also creates a valuable option on the second investment. The second investment provides incremental value 3v because of the complementarity.
The industry's second-best strategy is a pair of threshold values for cost, (c 1 ; c 2 ), that maximize 1 3v
The maximum satis es
This optimum entails two ine ciencies relative to a hypothetical rst best where c 1 and c 2 are observed before making the investment decisions. First, investments might be made even when c 1 +c 2 > 4v, which means that the investments together are unpro table. This is because the rst investment must be made before the option value on the second investment is realized. Second, the investments might not occur even when they would be pro table, that is, even when c 1 + c 2 < 4v. For example c 1 might be slightly higher than c 1 , while c 2 is close to zero.
Decentralized choices will not implement either (1) 
The Open Strategy with Proprietary Licensing 2.1 Openness and Ex Post Licensing
If the rms are constrained to make ex post licenses, the rst innovator will make his innovation open so that the second innovation can be compatible. This openness is purely informational { unlike the GPL, it allows the second innovator to use the proprietary information for compatibility, but the second innovator then has an infringing technology. To bring the second product into use, either by the rst innovator or by the second innovator himself, the two rms must make a license ex post.
When the two rms license ex post, it is natural to suppose that they will divide the \bargaining surplus" equally. The bargaining surplus is the value made available by the licensing agreement. The second innovation contributes v to the rst innovator and 2v to the second innovator, for a total of 3v: Thus, each rm gets 3v=2 in the ex post license.
If the second innovator chooses to be incompatible, he only gets value v ex post, so he will always choose compatibility, in anticipation of licensing. The rst innovator gets v \in kind", and in addition gets v=2 as a license price. The second innovation will take place if and only if c 2 3v=2:
Using the superscript \o" for \open," the pro t and expected pro t of the second innovation are the following, once the rst innovation has been made:
The rst innovator's pro t and expected pro t are
The cost thresholds for the two innovators are
To calculate total industry pro t, o ; the expected pro t of the second innovator must be weighted by the probability that the rst innovation is made. The second innovation cannot occur without the rst. I assume that the second innovation's costs are observable to the rst innovator when he o ers a license. This is an unrealistic assumption that I relax below.
The The second innovator's pro t is theñ
The rst innovator's pro t and expected pro t arẽ The cost thresholds for the two innovators are c 2 3v
To calculate total industry pro t,~ o ; the expected pro t of the second innovator must be weighted by the probability that the rst innovation is made: When 3v < c 2 (the third line) the rms will not invest in the second investment because it does not contribute a positive amount to joint pro t.
Assuming that the two rms share the bargaining surplus equally, and using the superscript \c" for \closed," the pro t of the second innovator is
The pro t of the rst innovator with cost c 1 is
Hence the rms with the rst and second ideas will invest if the costs c 1 and c 2 satisfy
Total pro t in the industry is The rms will invest if the costs c 1 and c 2 respectively satisfy
The expected pro ts of the two innovations are
To evaluate industry pro t, gpl ; the expected pro t of the second innovator must be weighted by the probability that the rst innovation takes place.
None of the three strategies { the open proprietary strategy, the closed proprietary strategy, or the open-source framework { will achieve the level of pro t that would be available with cooperation, either when the industry invests according to (1) , or when the industry invests according to (2) . Industry pro t will not be maximized because
Ex post licensing discourages investments in second innovations, because pro t is eroded by license fees. This also erodes the pro tability of the rst investment.
Intermediate licensing solves the ex post \holdup" problem, but joint pro t nevertheless \leaks" to the second innovator; hence, the rst innovator does not internalize the full bene t of the option he creates.
If the framework is open source, the division of pro ts is in exible. Innovations might not take place because one of the innovators might not have enough revenue to cover his own costs, even if total costs are covered by total revenue.
However, the GPL may be an improvement over licensing with fees.
The propositions below are proved from the following relationships. The rst two propositions explain what happens when the GPL is not in e ect, and the third proposition exposes the circumstances in which the GPL is preferred. 
This is due to (3) and (4).
Proposition 3 Suppose that intermediate-stage licenses are not feasible. Then the most pro table strategy for the industry as a whole is to commit to openness and to the GPL.
The most pro table strategy for the rst innovator, as the decision maker, is to disclose his technology, to make ex post licenses, and in particular, not to commit to the GPL. ` c 2 0. In addition to the pro t v that the rst innovator gets from the rst innovation, he gets additional pro t v +`with probability (2v `) =3v: Thus, the rst innovator's pro t can be written^
The licensee fee`= v=2 maximizes^ 1 ( ; c 1 ) : Thus, the investment thresholds for the rst and second innovators are 
Conclusion
In the model above, not only is there no con ict between openness and pro t, but open source is actually the pro t-maximizing strategy.
Open source has two key features: openness (disclosure) and the GPL. But why is the GPL more pro table than other types of licensing? Given the in exibility of the open-source arrangement, why wouldn't other forms of licensing be preferable, such as licenses that allow the rms to share revenues in a way that re ects their di erent costs?
The answer in this paper is that the more exible licenses might, in fact be preferable, but they might also be infeasible. Both the rst innovator and the industry as a whole are better o if the rst innovator can license on more generous terms when the second innovation will be costly. The problem is that the second innovation's costs are not observable to the rst innovator. The second innovator will always argue that the innovation is costly, and that he should be given generous terms.
There are two other options. The rst innovator can o er licenses at the intermediate stage that are not tailored to the second innovation's cost, or he can restrict himself to ex post licenses. It turns out in the model above that these are equivalent, and not very pro table for second innovators. The problem with ex post licenses is that the second innovator is negotiating after his costs are sunk, and will be held up for high licensing fees (Green and Scotchmer, 1995) . The GPL is a solution to the hold-up problem, which leads to a higher probability of achieving second innovations, and increases industry pro t as a whole.
The problem, however, is that once a rm nds itself in the position of rst innovator, it will want to exploit that position rather than o er a license that favors second innovators, or favors the industry as a whole. The rms must agree to the GPL behind the veil of ignorance, before anyone knows which rm will be in the position of rst innovator. This serves them well in expectation, because it leads to higher industry pro ts than otherwise.
